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COMMENTS
THE UNSETTLED LAW OF THIRD PARTY CONSENT
Introduction
An often repeated maxim of fourth amendment law states
that searches conducted without a warrant are "per se unreasonable. . . subject to a few specifically established and well-defined
exceptions."1 Most of those exceptions have been based on the
proposition that necessity or "exigent circumstances" may justify
a warrantless search.2 But one exception, embracing warrantless
searches validated by consent, requires no justification related
to the urgency of the situation. Direct consent to a search by
a defendant operates as a waiver of any right to be free from
a warrantless intrusion.3 Furthermore, the consent of a third
party to a warrantless search may defeat a defendant's fourth
amendment rights.
The validity of third party consents has become an increasingly common question in criminal trials of the past three
decades. Early cases viewed consent as a waiver of a constitutional right and insisted that a third party consent be clearly
voluntary and expressly authorized, so as to rise to the dignity
of such a waiver. However, the authority required for a third
party consent search expanded to include an independent right
to consent to a police search by a joint occupant of premises or
a joint user of personal effects. This recognition of independent
authority to consent based on joint control marked a major conceptual shift away from the original delegated waiver approach.
This change has been most often explained in terms of an "as1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See, e.g., Jones
v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) ("jealously and carefully
drawn"), quoted in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring) ("there is no more basic constitutional rule in
the Fourth Amendment area....").
2. The major exceptions include: search incident to arrest, Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (reviewing fluctuations of permissible
scope); stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (protection of
officer); evidence being destroyed, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973)

(blood under fingernails); evidence naturally dissipating, Schmerber v.

California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)

(alcohol in bloodstream); probable cause

search of vehicles on the highway, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925)

(mobility of car creates exigency); or of impounded vehicles,

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (no exigency necessary).
Justice Harlan's dissent in Chambers stressed the importance of exigencies in evaluating warrantless searches, 399 U.S. at 61-65.
3. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (discussing
fourth amendment waiver by consent).
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sumption of risk" theory in which a defendant assumes the risk
that a third party will consent to a search of jointly used property. This general rationale not only places a consent by a third
party in joint control beyond a defendant's contrary instructions
or expectations, but also permeates other third party consent
issues. Such issues include resulting plain view seizure, private
seizure, and the application of standing rules.
United States Supreme Court holdings in the third party
consent area have been sparse and somewhat indefinite. While
the independent right to consent theory has been generally accepted, various jurisdictions have taken divergent approaches to
related third party consent issues. California courts pioneered
a further shift of doctrinal focus, embodied by a standard requir-.
ing only proof of apparent authority to consent. The apparent
authority approach focuses on a police officer's reasonable belief
of authority to consent, as contrasted to the general joint control
rule which centers on a consenter's actual authority. On the
other hand, Illinois law has remained generally representative
of the many jurisdictions adhering to the independent right or
actual authority standard. Finally, the federal courts have experimented with various theories of general reasonableness and
assumption of risk, which tend to relax the remaining strictures
of the basic actual authority doctrine.
This comment will review the history of third party consent
law from its strict beginnings, using Illinois law to depict the
first fundamental shift of theory from waiver to independent authority. The California approach, requiring only apparent authority, will also be evaluated in the light of relevant Supreme
Court decisions. Finally, modern developments of the independent or actual authority standard will be examined in the
context of Illinois and federal case law.
The ultimate issue that this comment will consider is the
applicability of the fourth amendment warrant requirement to
seizures based on third party consent. Where the consenter does
not have actual authority to consent, should the resulting search
and seizure be subject to the fundamental maxim that warrantless action is per se unreasonable? If not, the limited validity
of such a consent would suffice to satisfy the warrant requirement. This in effect would permit the gap of authority to be
filled by an augmenting theory that stresses only the general
reasonableness of the resulting search and seizure. In this manner the vanishing limits on consent searches stand in sharp contrast to the rigorous scrutiny once applied to warrantless searches
supported by a claim of third party consent.
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EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THIRD PARTY CONSENT LAW

There Once Was A Question Of Waiver
The propriety of warrantless police searches and seizures,
based on the consent of a person other than the challenging
party, was considered in state and lower federal court decisions
as long ago as 1850. 4 The Supreme Court's landmark ruling in
Weeks v. United States,5 formally introducing the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the federal courts, summarily rejected
a boarder's consent to police entry offered to justify a search
of the landlord's private rooms in the house. 6
The first Supreme Court decision to evaluate a third party
7
consent in a family residential setting, Amos v. United States,
found a wife's acquiescence in a search of the home invalid on
the ground of implicit coercion.8 The Amos court, by expressly
leaving open the issue of her authority to consent, perpetuated
doubts as to the right of a wife to waive her husband's fourth
amendment rights." The Illinois Supreme Court followed Amos
in People v. Lind,10 ruling that the likelihood of coercion was
too great where the husband was under arrest and the wife had
not invited the police entry. The Lind court further noted that
under the greater weight of authority, a wife could not waive
her husband's right to be free from warrantless searches unless
specifically authorized by him to do so. 11
4. Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 (1850), involved a trespass action

against a state officer. The Rhode Island Supreme Court indicated that
a wife had no implied authority to consent to the search of the marital
home. Accord, United States v. Rykowski, 276 F. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920).
Contra, Grim v. Robinson, 31 Neb. 540, 48 N.W. 388 (1891) ("moral
duty to consent"). Humes was overruled by State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377,
60 A.2d 841 (1948).
5. 232 U.S.383 (1914).
6. Id. at 386. Another entry had been made when a neighbor
showed agents where the extra key was hidden. The Court refused to
entertain the argument that such consent redeemed the searches.
7. 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
8. See Fitter v. United States, 258 F. 567 (2d Cir. 1919) "[A] request
[to search] was made which was acceded to by Fitter's wife. What was
done was undoubtedly an arbitrary and unlawful violation of Fitter's
constitutional rights." Id. at 574.
9. There were no aggravating circumstances in Amos, only implied
acquiescence to the officer's authority, 255 U.S. at 315. See United States
v. Linderman, 32 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1940) (submission to a mere
request to search not valid consent). Despite the drive for women's
emancipation and its limited success in the nineteenth amendment, the
Amos court may have still considered a wife subordinate in the home,
and her will easily overcome by the police in the absence of her husband.
10. 370 Ill. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938). Illinois began excluding illegally seized evidence in People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112
(1924).
11. 370 Ill. at 136-37, 18 N.E.2d at 191. See Annot., 58 A.L.R. 737
(1929). There were rare cases in which a husband's consent was offered
against a defendant wife. Only one, People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616,
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Amos and Lind implicitly recognized the general validity of
a third party consent to search if clearly voluntary and expressly
2
authorized.1'
But the Illinois Supreme Court carved an exception
out of this express authority requirement in People v. Shambley. 13 Mrs. Shambley, victim of her husband's armed assault,
invited a police search for the gun after his arrest. The court
unsurprisingly held that the wife had exercised an independent
14
right to consent to the search of the jointly occupied dwelling.
This approach relegated the arrested and removed defendant's
constitutional right of privacy to irrelevance, as if forfeited.
Under the circumstances, where the consenter had called for the
police protection, the agency test requiring consent to be expressly authorized must have seemed unattractive and inapposite. 15
The Shambley court expressly limited its "independent authority" standard to the "peculiar facts" of the case. 16 Obviously,
those spouses crying out in distress invoke a duty of immediate police response. However, the Shambley exception soon
17
engulfed the express authorization rule. In People v. Perroni,
217 N.W. 797 (1928), rejected a husband's consent as lacking authority.
There the wife owned the searched premises and the husband had previously moved out.
12. The boundaries of valid consent in commercial tenancy and business contexts also developed along strict lines of proprietary authority
requiring reservation or delegation thereof with express authorization to
consent to a police search. See, e.g., Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58
(9th Cir. 1931) (landlord consent invalid against casual occupant); Raine
v. United States, 299 F. 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 611 (1924)
(two judges found ranch caretaker's consent invalid); Driskill v. United
States, 281 F. 146 (9th Cir. 1922) (garage lessor's consent as joint user).
See also State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 559 P.2d 970 (1977) (dissent
discusses employee consent extensively).
13. 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
14. Id. at 42, 122 N.E.2d at 174. The court perceived the "independent
right" standard as well established, although this approach had been at
best infrequently and tentatively applied to a wife's consent. See Annot.,
31 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1953) (discerning contrary rule). The court relied
chiefly on Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 844 (1948) (same) and State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d
841 (1948) (police uninvited, wife's consent upheld).
15. The cry of distress, telephoned in Shambley, led to a third party
consent spurred by exigent circumstances, though the police could have
easily procured a warrant after the defendant's arrest. See Woodard v.
United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (aged lessee found guest's
gun). When Shambley was decided, many courts were critical of
searches conducted without a warrant or clear exigencies necessitating
warrantless action. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948). But cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (stressing only reasonableness of broad search incident to arrest). In United
States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1954), the court of appeals
stated that it was "high time that courts place their stamp of disapproval
upon this increasing practice of . . .searching a home without a warrant
on the theory of consent.. . ." Id. at 637.

16. 4 Ill. 2d at 43, 122 N.E.2d at 174.
17. 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 980,
1004 (1959). The court focused on the courtesy and thus the reasonable-
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the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a trailer home search based
on the consent of a merely cooperative spouse after the defendant's arrest, without discussing its departure from the implied
coercion rule. The convenience of a third party consent search
had triumphed over a central constitutional privacy right in
Illinois,18 despite the failure to obtain a proper warrant, despite
the inability to establish exigent circumstances,"' and despite the
strong precedential skepticism about the voluntariness of consent
to uninvited searches. 20 No longer would a defendant's right of
privacy be relevant to the validity of a search where the consent
of a competent joint occupant could be established. The risk of
such a consent was placed fully on the sharer.
The validity of a search based on voluntary consent of a joint
occupant of a dwelling gradually became the general rule in state
and lower federal courts.2 1 As the focus shifted to the authority
necessary to exercise an independent right to consent, most
ness of police conduct in effecting the search, rather than using the strict

scrutiny that would have precluded any consent to an uninvited search
by Perroni's wife. As an independent ground for its decision, the court
held that Perroni lacked standing to complain of the search because he
failed to allege ownership of the trailer or the tools seized. Id. at 593,
153 N.E.2d at 582. See text accompanying note 40 infra.
18. The preeminent sanctity of the home under the fourth amendment has been long recognized, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886). Therefore, limitations on the privacy of the home should
apply a fortiori in other settings.
19. Where no compelling necessity can be shown, the loss of an individual's unwaived fourth amendment rights, because of a third party's
independent consent to a search directed at the other, must mean that
mere convenience has been granted priority over a fundamental constitutional right. This unpalatable result has been the source of continuing
academic criticism. See note 21 infra.
20. See Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1953),
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Cf. Byrd
v. State, 161 Tenn. 306, 30 S.W.2d 273 (1930) (consent by "ignorant"
wife).
21. Academic response to this shift away from strict waiver theory
has been persistently negative. See Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches
& The Fourth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 283 (1974); Note,
Family Consent to Unlawful Search, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (1971);
Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. CHi. L. REV. 797,
800-01 (1966) (expansion anomalous); Comment, The Use of Evidence
Obtained During a Search and Seizure Consented to by the Defendant's
Spouse, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 653, 658 (marriage should not diminish right
of privacy). But Lester v. State, 216 Tenn. 615, 393 S.W.2d 288 (1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 952 (1966) (upholding wife's consent to seizure of
husband's coat), noted that since the A.L.R; survey in 1953, note 14 supra,
only four cases had invalidated a wife's consent and only one for lack
of authority, State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963), overruled
in Yuma Co. Atty. v. McGuire, 111 Ariz. 437, 532 P.2d 157 (1975). Older
decisions that required a wife's consent to be based on express authorization have been generally overruled. E.g., Simmons v. State, 94 Okla.
Crim. 243, 229 P.2d 615 (1951), overruled in Burkham v. State, 538
P.2d 1121 (Okla. Crim'. 1975); compare Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626,
105 N.E.2d 509 (1952) with Lindsey v. State, 246 Ind. 431, 204 N.E.2d
357 (1965). See also Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 500 S.W.2d 417 (Ky.
1973) (rise of women's rights); State v. Blakely, 230 So. 2d 698 (Fla. App.
1970) (unemployed wife not in joint control).
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courts agreed that one having coequal rights to access, use and
occupancy could validly consent. 2
The United States Supreme
Court steadily declined review while this new standard developed, 2 3 limiting itself to occasional rebuffs of consents by landlords. 24 Without express Supreme Court approval, the fourth
amendment protection of the home, center of the personal right
to freedom from official intrusion conducted without warrant or
clear necessity, 25 had been breached by a broadly construed independent right to consent to entry and search vested in cooccupants.
The requirement of an authorized waiver of a
defendant's constitutional right had yielded to recognition of a
general assumption of risk rationale based on the sharing of property.
Other Principlesof Assumption of Risk
The independent right standard did not resolve all the problems of third party consent leading to seizure of another's
property.26 While consent to search may be entirely valid, authority to consent to a seizure may be lacking and further
justification thus necessary to establish the admissibility of resulting evidence. If the seized property had not even been
jointly used by the consenter, the consent alone clearly could
2 7
not justify the seizure.
PlainView
One solution to this dilemma has been to uphold the seizure
of items in the "plain view" of police whose presence was based

22. See United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839,
842-43 (3rd Cir. 1970) (reviewing rise of rule).
23. Id.
24. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (hotel managers); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord with right of entry "to view waste");
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (night clerk); Louden v. Utah,
379 U.S. 1 (1964) (per curiam) (innkeeper).
25. Several early decisions upholding a wife's consent to a search
of the home carefully buttressed that position with exigent circumstaces. E.g., United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857 (D. Mass. 1948)
(Army search in Austria during technical state of war). Cf. United
States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) (distillery might have
blown up while officers sought warrant).
26. For particularized treatment of these problems, see text accompanying notes 82 & 145 infra.
27. See, e.g., Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823, 826 (5th Cir.
1955) (locked cabinet in shared garage). One significant inroad on this
limitation, or gap of authority, began in Botsch v. United States, 364 F.2d
542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967), on the theory of
a gap-bridging "exculpatory interest", see text accompanying note 170
infra.
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on a valid consent. 28 The essence of the plain view doctrine is
that police, whose presence is lawful, have the right to seize evidence that they encounter. 2 This separate exception to the warrant requirement provides a convenient augmentation of the
effective scope of a third party consent. Thus the plain view
doctrine clearly expands the assumption of risk that is already
associated with third part consent, by allowing seizure of property
not jointly used by the consenter.
The recent notion that plain view should be inadvertent for
the warrant requirement to be avoided would seem to limit this
augmentation.3 0 As is later noted, however, the inadvertency
rule has not been generally applied to consent based plain view
seizures.

31

When the Supreme Court decided Frazier v. Cupp 32 in 1969,
it expressly approved a third party consent search for the first
time in its history. Frazier involved consent to the search of a
28. See, e.g., United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.

1962) (effects in trunk of borrowed car).

29. Such seizures were limited to contraband, instrumentalities and
fruits of crime until Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (5-4 on this
issue). Since then any item of apparent evidentiary value has been subject to a proper plain view seizure. The majority in Hayden discarded
the traditional distinction between contraband and other personal property as irrational. Hayden is a stark example of the modern focus on
the right of privacy diminishing the traditional protection of proprietary
security.
30. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 413 U.S. 443, 466-71 (1971) (plurality opinion). Justice Harlan's decisive concurrence was somewhat "difficult," noting criticism of overemphasizing warrant requirements and indicating that the basic issue underlying the plurality's "inadvertent plain
view" rationale was unresolved. Id. at 490-92. Justice White's dissent
criticized the inadvertent plain view rule at considerable length. He
noted that the rule was apparently to be applied to all plain view situations, including any legal police entry of premises, and argued that the
rule would lead only to arbitrary results. He pointed particularly to the
Court's failure to mention the inadvertency rule's relation to third party
consent searches, where specific intent to search is commonplace, and
suggested that an intentional plain view seizure in a third party consent
search had been approved in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 403
U.S. at 510, 516-20. But see note 34 infra. Justice White's criticism of
the rule's arbitrary results would seem to have particular force in relation to third party consent law. Once one accepts the independent
right to consent theory, application of the inadvertency rule would tend
to invalidate consent searches based on probable cause, while admitting
the fruits of consent searches which resulted from purely arbitrary
rummaging. But the source of this anomalous result is not so much the
warrant oriented inadvertency rule, but rather the unique nature of the
third party consent exception to the warrant requirement, which does
not demand probable cause, compelling urgency, or consent by the object
of the search.
31. See notes 164 & 194 and accompanying text infra.
32. 394 U.S. 731 (1969), aff'g Gladden v. Frazier, 388 F.2d 777 (9th
Cir. 1968) (vacating habeas corpus relief on other grounds). The Ninth
Circuit had found a valid plain view seizure, but also indicated that any
error was harmless, 388 F.2d at 783. The Supreme Court stated that the
challenge to the search could be "dismissed rather quickly," 394 U.S. at
740.
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jointly used duffel bag which was owned by the defendant and
temporarily shared by his cousin. The Court refused to consider
"metaphysical subtleties" and held that Frazier had assumed the
risk of a sharer's consent.33 The Court seemed to justify the
actual seizure of the defendant's bloodstained clothing on a plain
view theory.3 4 Despite this apparent ratification of an augmented independent right to consent, Frazier discussed the issue
only briefly, without enunciating any clear standard and without
referring to any relevant lower court precedent. Nevertheless,
assumption of risk was clearly approved as the pragmatic basis
for evaluating a seizure based on a sharer's consent.3 5 The assumption of risk rationale has also been applied to third party
seizures of a defendant's property.
Private Seizure
The problem of lack of authority to consent to search or
seizure has been avoided where the facts showed a spontaneous
delivery of the property by the third party.3 6 In that situation,
the private party has performed the initial conversion or theft
without enough government involvement to trigger fourth
amendment protection. 37 Both private and plain view seizures
represent unprotected risks to an individual's otherwise shielded
privacy. The private seizure rule places all moveable property
33. 394 U.S. at 740. It was argued that the consenter only had permission to use one compartment of the bag and lacked the authority to
consent to other parts. The Court refused to consider the issue of whether the party had authority only over a section of the duffel bag. However, at least one court has magnified this refusal to validate the search
of another's separate bedroom by a joint occupant of the dwelling, United
States v. Cataldo, 433 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1970) (alternate ground), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971).
34. The stated purpose of the search was to obtain the consenter's
clothing. The Court seemed to consider the discovery inadvertent, since
it cited Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (inadvertent discovery of evidence in impounded vehicle) and Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (evidence encountered in hot pursuit).
35. See note 164 and accompanying text infra.
36. Compare Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (no police
involvement until months after theft of defendant's papers) (Holmes and
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) with Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at
487-90 ("inadvertent" inquiry as to arrested defendant's guns and clothing followed by "spontaneous" delivery by wife).
37. Burdeau held in effect that knowing receipt of stolen goods by
police, with no intention of restoration to the owner, did not amount to
a constitutional violation. Coolidge extended this principle to an innocent conversion of a spouse's personal property, despite the initial police
questions about the specific items. Although the consenter offered the
guns and clothing to police, the taking could have been readily interpreted as a decision to make a plain view seizure. But the approach
chosen provided an alternative solution for similar situations, common
in third party consent cases, where plain view was intentional and thus
might be unacceptable under the inadvertent plain view doctrine. See
Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965).
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at the mercy of persons bold enough to exert unauthorized control over it and turn it over to police, whether seeking favor
or merely taking justice into their own hands.3 8 Personal effects
therefore, enjoy less protection than the home or business premises, which cannot be validly searched or seized 39 on the basis
of an unauthorized consent.
Standing
In addition to the risks of private and consent-based plain
view seizures, criminal defendants have long been subject to the
risk that evidence might be illegally seized under circumstances
that precluded a defendant from establishing standing to challenge its admission at trial. Reasoning that the fourth amendment and its state constitutional equivalents embody personal
rights, courts have generally refused to hear challenges to
searches unless based on a violation of the petitioner's own right
to security in his person or property. 40 Furthermore, a criminal
defendant seeking to invoke such a right has long been required
to make potentially incriminating standing allegations. 41 An
owner or lessee of searched premises could rely on their relatively
innocuous proprietary interests to establish standing 4 2 but
guests, visitors and occupants of dubious status were granted no
proprietary standing and were generally obliged to assert a more
incriminating interest in the seized property itself. 4" The effec38. Additionally, a defendant risks the meek, dutiful, blithely ig-

norant, self-exculpatory or fully hostile assistance of a third party to
police by the private seizure of exclusively personal property.
39. Buildings and other real property may be considered as seized
where government agents exercise an exclusive dominion over the area.
See Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895) (mandamus to remove police guard from boiler room).

40. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)

(finding

some merit in, but rejecting, broadened fourth amendment standing
argument).
41. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932) (Learned Hand,
J.) (unsympathetic to the dilemma). The only contrary federal case before 1960 was United States v. Dean, 50 F.2d 905 (D. Mass. 1931) (possessory offense). A virtually universal rule permitted use of any such allegations as admissions in the prosecution's case in chief. See, e.g., Heller
v. United States, 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 567 (1932);
Monroe v. United States, 320 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 991 (1964). Contra, Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (harmless error). Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968),
abolished that rule, forbidding use of standing admissions on the issue
of guilt. But impeachment of a testifying defendant's credibilty with

such admissions remained a possibility, People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211,

317 N.E.2d 545 (1974).
42. However, the lack of a technical right to immediate possession
of premises may preclude a lessor's standing. E.g., People v. DeFilippis,
54 Ill. App. 2d 137, 203 N.E.2d 627 (1964) (garage lessor).
43. See In re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942) (noting unanimity
of rule). An argument that a statute abolishing property rights in contraband eliminated even this perilous and narrow basis for standing was
rejected in United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54 (1951).
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tive denial of dwelling privacy to all but formal occupants was
mitigated by the Supreme Court in 1960, when standing was extended to any person lawfully present on the premises where
the search occurred.4 4 This partial relaxation reduced the general chilling effect of standing requirements on the assertion of
challenges to third party consents.
Innovation in California: A Two Edged Sword
In 1955, when the California Supreme Court adopted the
exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence in criminal trials,4 5
the general independent authority standard of consent by a joint
user of premises or effects was becoming entrenched, and the
standing dilemma was still in full force. The California court
proceeded to abolish all requirements of standing to contest a
search, eradicating that burden in favor of the interest in deterring illegal police searches.4 6 As a consequence, California courts
would entertain the broadest possible range of challenges to third
47
party consent.
At the same time, however, California departed from the traditional implicit coercion rule, choosing rather to consider the
voluntariness of a consent based on the totality of the circumstances.4 8 And in People v. Gorg,411the California Supreme Court
ruled that the state need only establish a voluntary consent by
one whom the police reasonably believed to have the necessary
authority. This doctrine of "apparent authority" launched in
Gorg was to enjoy a long reign in California law, and would represent a definite influence on the law of third party consent in
other jurisdictions.
APPARENT AUTHORITY IN

CALIFORNIA

Gorg and Early Applications
The defendant in Gorg was a law student originally arrested
44. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
45. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
46. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
47. In addition to removing the chilling effect of required standing
allegations, and recognizing privacy rights in casual occupants and visitors, the abolition of standing rules created a new variety of third party
consent. Any consent by another, leading to evidence against a defendant who didn't have the faintest claim to the premises searched or property seized, became a challengeable third party consent. This new "impersonal" type of challenge did not involve any new questions of authority, but did increase the volume of law on the basic issues.
48. People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955), approved
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). One motivation may
have been strong pressure by indignant law enforcement officials. See
People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956) (Carter, J., dissenting).
49. 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
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for shoplifting. Police went to the house where he lived and
asked permission to search his room. A young man, who also
occupied and happened to own the house, consented. Marijuana
5
Gorg claimed that
was subsequently discovered in a drawer.
sought to have
and
gardening
for
exchange
in
room
the
he rented
51
Court refused
Supreme
California
The
the evidence suppressed.
property and
prevailing
under
Gorg
to resolve this issue for
52
belief of the
reasonable
the
agency approaches, holding that
was
authority
of
officers in the live-in landlord's appearance
5 3
it
that
enough to sustain the search. Justice Traynor explained
the
was not necessary to proscribe reasonable mistakes as to
extent of authority in order to serve the policy of deterring police
misconduct.5 4 Although the search could not be justified by an
independent right to consent, the court did not consider the lack
of exigency, the unexcused failure to obtain a warrant or the
clear intent to search that prompted the police visit, in applying
"
the new apparent authority rule.
The focus of inquiry into third party consent thus underwent
a second significant shift in Gorg. The early requirement of a
waiver clearly attributable to the defendant had generally
yielded to burgeoning independent right to consent theories;
Gorg required only that police have a reasonable belief that authority to consent existed at the time of the search. The difficulty of requiring police to assess the correct status of consenting
occupants of a dwelling, in the face of an expanding variety of
50. Id. at 779, 291 P.2d at 471.

51. Id. at 778, 291 P.2d at 470.
52. Id. at 783, 291 P.2d at 473. If Gorg was recognized as a tenant,
no existing precedent would have supported the landlord's consent. But
the court could have treated Gorg as a guest and upheld the consent.

See Calhoun v. United States, 172 F.2d 457, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938
(1949) (guest's rights "ousted" by landlord consent).
53. The consenter claimed to be preparing the room for a visit by

his father when the police arrived. Whether an arrested person's room
should be subject to an increased right of consent by one with a general
short
interest in the premises would seem to depend on the situation. Atermior informal lease on a room or storage locker could lapse or be

nated, enabling a third party consent because of the arrestee's involun627
tary absence, see People v. Crayton, 174 Cal. App. 2d 267, 344 P.2d 1212

(1959) (motel manager's consent). Cf. Hayes v. Cady, 500 F.2d
(7th Cir. 1974) (arrestee's denial of occupancy validated landlady's consent). But cf. State v. Taggart, 7 Ore. App. 479, 491 P.2d 1187 (1971)
(landlady's consent rejected).
54. It has been suggested that some mistakes as to authority may
be treated as acceptable mistakes of fact. See note 76 infra. Cf. Hill
v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971) (valid search incident to mistaken ar-

rest of guest).

55. But since deterrence of misconduct serves as a safeguard for the
served
basic value of constitutional privacy, fundamental policy is not
by allowing unauthorized consents. See Comment, Two Years With the
Cahan Rule, 9 STAN. L. REV. 515, 532 (1957) (calling for narrow application of Gorg).
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household arrangements,5" was simply and effectively mitigated
by the Gorg rule. Any future inquiry into the legality of such
57
a search would turn on the probity of simple police testimony.
Moreover, the privacy of the home had been delivered into the
58
power of any landlord, casual guest, trespasser or even burglar
59
capable of asserting apparent authority over the premises.
Soon after Gorg, the search of a murder defendant's living
quarters, supported by consents of the homeowner and caretaker,
was held valid under the apparent authority rule. The status
of the defendant in the house, whether as a tenant, servant or
guest, was deemed irrelevant. 0 ° Shortly thereafter, however, the
state supreme court suggested closer inquiry into the consenter's
relation to the defendant and his property to evaluate the apparent authority of the consent to search. The court strongly
implied that a dweller's right of privacy in rooms and effects
might extend beyond the reach of even his wife's right to consent to a search."1 Nevertheless, in another murder case an appellate court validated the consent of the defendant's babysitter
obtained at the police station. 2 Although the consenter did not
appear to exercise any authority other than that of a babysitter,
her consent was held sufficient to allow an uninvited search of
56. It would seem anomalous that an unconventional or informal arrangement might enjoy greater protection than socially approved family
and commercial relationships.
57. The strong presumption of truth generally accorded police testimony works to make the official version of contested events dispositive
in most cases, despite the somewhat self-serving nature of justifying a
search. Notwithstanding the undoubtedly great reliability of police in
general, the Seventh Circuit had warned that fourth amendment protection "should not be made dependent upon the probity of an officer attempting to justify a search of consent," United States v. Arrington, 215
F.2d 630. 637 (7th Cir. 1954).
58. The spectre of consent by a wholly unauthorized stranger, unlawfully on the premises, may be somewhat offset by the various uncertainties that reliance on such a consent would introduce. Doubts could arise
as to the true source of seized evidence. An inference might arise that
the helpful intruder was a police agent, and even if the searching police
were unaware of that, the validity of the search would probably be
vitiated. Cf. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) (no laundering
of probable cause).
59. Such an assertion need only amount to colorable acquiescence in
police efforts. See People v. Yancey, 196 Cal. App. 2d 665, 16 Cal. Rptr.
766 (1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 369 (1963) (Douglas, J., would grant)
(woman motioning with head); People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal. App. 2d
63, 300 P.2d 194 (1956) (pregnant wife; aware husband just arrested).
60. People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal. 2d 68, 292 P.2d 513 (1956).

61. People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 746-47, 312 P.2d 665, 670 (1957)
(dictum) (search of husband's truck). An appellate court had already

managed to reject the consent of a teenaged daughter after her father's
arrest, People v. Jennings, 142 Cal. App. 2d 160, 298 P.2d 56 (1956)
(harmless error).
62. People v. Misquez, 152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 313 P.2d 206 (1957). The
defendant had asked the police to give his key to the sitter. They complied, but immediately asked the sitter to give the key back so that a
search could be made.
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the defendant's dwelling for evidence., :! This questionable application of the Gorg rule perhaps reflected the lower courts' reluctance to suppress reliable evidence.4
Despite the potential scope of the Gorg rule, there have been
no reported California cases involving the consent of a third
party whose presence proved to be felonious. Perhaps the closest
case to this controversial situation was the early decision of
People v. Howard.65 There an appellate court approved the consent of a girl who had climbed in a window of the defendant's
dwelling to admit police. The troubling question posed by her
lack of proper access, diminishing the appearance of her authority, was largely ignored by the appellate court. 66 Despite these
questionable holdings, most early applications of the Gorg rule
involved routine consents by joint occupants and reached results
entirely consistent with the basic actual authority approach of
other jurisdictions. 67
The Consent of Building Managers: An
Overextension of Gorg
In People v. Roberts, 8 the prosecution conceded that a hotel
manager's consent and assistance to the entry of a rented room
was without authority. But in People v. Ambrose, " an appellate
court held that a hotel manager's consent to a room search was
valid, and a state supreme court hearing was narrowly denied,
Justice Traynor and two others dissenting. Several other appel7
late decisions reached similar results. 11
63. Id. at 479-80, 313 P.2d at 211. Cf. Butler v. Commonwealth, 536
S.W. 2d 139 (Ky. 1971) (babysitter's consent good against her guest).
Contra, People v. Litwin, 44 App. Div. 2d 492, 355 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1973).
64. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 195 Cal. App. 2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177
(1961) (consent by college dormitory housemaster; felony investigation
an "emergency").
65. 166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1958). The police discovered
stolen property. A factor influencing approval of the search may have
been the defendant's failure to contest the girl's right of entry.
66. Similarly, an appellate court stated that a search based on the
consent of a professedly casual occupant found alone in defendant's
dwelling was "probably reasonable," People v. Herman, 163 Cal. App.
2d 821, 329 P.2d 989 (1958) (harmless error).
67. See, e.g., People v. Ransome, 180 Cal. App. 2d 140, 4 Cal. Rptr.
347, cert. denied sub nom. Dean v. California, 364 U.S. 887 (1960) (sisterin-law cotenant); People v. Ingle, 53 Cal. 2d 407, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 348
P.2d 577, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 841 (1960) (wife); People v. Silva, 140
Cal. App. 2d 791, 295 P.2d 942 (1956) (co-occupant of hotel room).
68. 299 P.2d 313 (Cal. App.), aff'd, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 722 (1956).
The police claimed to have heard moans, presumably of distress, from
within the room. The room was empty but the police searched anyway. There was speculation that the noise might have been made by
pigeons. The courts ruled that the search was justified by these "exigencies." The case cannot be viewed as a third party consent by the pigeons
but does suggest the possibility of valid consent to entry by an unseen
parrot in California.
69. 155 Cal. App. 2d 513, 318 P.2d 181 (1957).
70. See People v. Williams, 189 Cal. App. 2d 29, 11 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1961)

128 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11: 115

In People v. Stoner,7 1 the state chose not to rely on the hotel
manager's consent, securing appellate affirmance on a search incident to arrest theory."' Since the arrest took place in another
state thirty-six hours after the search, the state found itself
falling back on an apparent authority theory before the United
States Supreme Court. In the meantime, a California court had
rejected a hotel manager's consent as lacking even apparent au74
thority.78 The Supreme Court's decision, Stoner v. California,
likewise rejected "unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority' "
and reversed Stoner's conviction for armed robbery. Justice
Stewart echoed the traditional doctrine of third party consent:
It is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night
clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right, therefore, which only
petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or
through an agent. 7'5

The Supreme Court, despite the arguably broad implications of
this language, did not indicate disapproval of the general joint
control test and avoided any definitive holding on the issue of
apparent authority. The Court found that there was no basis
for a police belief that the night clerk had been expressly authorized to consent by the defendant, so the apparent authority issue
was not squarely raised.
Gorg's Ongoing Vitality
Whatever doubt Stoner may have cast on the general apparent authority approach by rejecting an improvident extension of
it, v' the basic vitality of Garg continued to be recognized by California courts.7 7 However, greater caution had already begun to
(apartment manager); People v. Crayton, 174 Cal. App. 2d 267, 344 P.2d
627 (1959) (motel manager after checkout time); People v. Dillard,
168 Cal. App. 2d 158, 335 P.2d 702 (1959) (apartment manager); People
v. Hicks, 165 Cal. App. 2d 548, 331 P.2d 1003 (1958) (hotel manager,
storage room). Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (upholding consent of hotel manager after defendant arrested and checked
out by F.B.I.).
71. 205 Cal. App. 2d 108, 22 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 483
(1964).
72. The appellate court held that failure to obtain a warrant was not
fatal to the search, and that the police were not bound by the night
clerk's statement that he knew the defendant was not there.
73. People v. Burke, 208 Cal. App. 2d 149, 24 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1962)
(harmless error since police would have gotten evidence later).
74. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
75. Id. at 489. Thus the Court refused to adopt an assumption of
risk approach premised on a lessor's power of access.
76. A federal court once suggested that Stoner overruled the whole
Gorg doctrine, Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1966), (civil
rights action); but Stoner and Gorg have been harmonized as well. See
Ferguson v. State, 488 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Alas. 1971); Lafave, Search and
Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not . . . Run Smooth," 1966

U. ILL. L. F. 255, 322 (reasonable mistake of fact acceptable).
77. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 409
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find expression.In Tompkins v. Superior Court,"' the state
supreme court held that the consent of a cotenant was unavailing
if the defendant was present and objected to the search. Justice
Traynor analyzed the nature of joint tenancy and concluded that
a tenant could not be reasonably considered as empowered to
allow a search over a cotenant's interposed objection."s A definite actual authority standard, slightly limiting third party
consents to dwelling searches, 8' proved to be definitive of the
reasonable extent of apparent authority.
Similarly, the state supreme court rejected the extension of
a consent search to the luggage of a guest.8 2 Since the police
were told that the luggage belonged to others, apparent authority
could not be established.8 3 The court in People v. McGrew,"4
in like manner refused to apply Gorg to validate an airline employee's consent to the search of a shipped footlocker. The bare
majority of the state supreme court again found careful consideration of the underlying actual authority standard necessary, and
determined that the authority of the airline was insufficient to
8 5
render the consent objectively reasonable.
P.2d 222 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967) (consent by girlfriend).
78. See People v. Frank, 225 Cal. App. 2d 339, 37 Cal. Rptr. 202
(1964) (defendant's presence in room terminated landlady's apparent authority); Castenada v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 439, 30 Cal. Rptr. 1,
380 P.2d 641 (1963) (consent after efforts to mislead involuntary); Bielicki v. Superior Court. 57 Cal. 2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 371 P.2d 288
(1962) (spypipe in ceiling of amusement park restroom with consent of
owner held unlawful). Despite Bielicki, a split panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld a similar consent surveillance, suggesting the applicability
of Gorg's apparent authority rule, Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251,
259 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
79. 59 Cal. 2d 65, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113 (1963). Contra,
People v. Smith, 183 Cal. App. 2d 670, 6 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1960).
80. 59 Cal. 2d at 68-69, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 892, 378 P.2d at 116. The
"reasonable belief" of the officers was simply
held unreasonable as a
matter of law. This approach made it clear that the belief had to be
objectively reasonable. Despite Gorg's focus on deterrence of unreasonable conduct, Tompkins showed that subjective good faith was not
enough. This position is perhaps best explained by the potential unmanageability of a subjective standard.
81. The narrowness of the Tompkins limitation in California was
shown in People v. Linke, 265 Cal. App. 2d 297, 71 Cal. RDtr. 371 (1968)
(defendant present and not complaining can't raise objection later), and
People v. Vermouth, 20 Cal. App. 3d 746, 98 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1971) (suitcase
claimed by nonarrestee held validly searched as incident to arrest of car's
driver). See Vandenburg v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 876 (1970) (minor's objection ineffective against father's consent).
82. People v. Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 40 Cal. Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d 889
(1964).
83. But for that notice, a purported consent might have prevailed,
even if the consenter had no key or other proper access to the locked
effect, provided there was a reasonable belief in his authority. See note
65 and accompanying text supra.
84. 1 Cal. 3d 404, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 462 P.2d 1 (1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 909 (1970).
85. Imputing notice of the airline's limited authority (a matter of
public record) to the summoned officers would vitiate their reasonable
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Despite its preoccupation with appropriate limitations, the
California Supreme Court took occasion to defend the basic Gorg
rule, noting that it had been consistently reaffirmed.8 6 That
flexible application of the apparent authority doctrine retained
some vitality was demonstrated by an appellate court in People
v. Amadio. s7 That decision condoned the consent of an arrested
third party to the search of a car in which he had .only an informal interest, lacking both immediate control and coequal
joint use, the court analogizing these facts to a cotenancy. 8s In
another flexible application, the state supreme court avoided the
clear limitation barring nonoccupant landlord consents, upholding a lessor's consent because the defendant's duplex was "apparently abandoned."8 9 These cases strongly indicated that caution in using the apparent authority rule had not led to its
practical demise.
The California Supreme Court returned to its practice of
careful scrutiny of authority in Burrows v. Superior Court 0 In
Burrows, a bank had relinquished its records of customer transactions to police. The court held that the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy in those records could not be defeated by
the bank's voluntary consent to the seizure. 9 ' Since the court
was once again determining a basic actual authority standard, apparent authority was not discussed. The potential scope of the
belief of any greater authority to consent. As in Cruz, the right of privacy in a locked effect prevailed over the consent of a mere custodian.
Comparable federal decisions have been generally contrary, see note 163
infra.
86. People v. Hill, 69 Cal. 2d 550, 72 Cal. Rptr. 641, 446 P.2d 521
(1968), aff'd, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
87. 22 Cal. App. 3d 7, 98 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1971).
88. Id. at 14, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 913. The consenter had neither title
nor possession of the car, only a right of occasional use. Approval of
his consent might have been better rationalized by a theory of a conspirator's right to consent. See note 168 infra.
89. People v. Carr, 8 Cal. 3d 287, 104 Cal. Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513
(1972). As the occupant eluded arrest, his landlord exercised his right
of reentry for the search. But see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610 (1961) (landlord's right of entry insufficient).
90. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590 (1974).
91. The unanimous court (Clark, J., dissented from denial of rehearing) saw its result as entirely consistent with California Bankers Ass'n
v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (bank's challenge to statute requiring certain records to be available held premature) and United States v. Miller,
500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974) (bank's voluntary consent invalid), rev'd,
425 U.S. 435 (1976) (records belong to bank; assumption of risk). After
the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Miller, Burrows remained good law in California. Carlson v. Superior Court, 58
Cal. App. 3d 13, 129 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976) (state allowed to provide
greater protection than minimal constitutional standard). The Burrows
limitation relied less on strict property and authority concepts than the
analogous McGrew common carrier rule, but rather attempted to blunt
the threat of massive invasions of financial privacy without judicial authorization. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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Gorg doctrine was again limited by the reasonable extent of
92
actual authority.
Ten years after the United States Supreme Court rejected
a loose extension of the Gorg rule, apparent authority remained
the governing standard of third party consent in California.
Whether because an overriding federal constitutional standard
was never formulated, or because California was allowed to be
a laboratory for testing a new standard, or because California's
preoccupation with limiting that standard inhibited review, the
Gorg rule continued to survive.
United States v. Matlock & Beyond
Federal prosecutors proffered the basic Gorg rule to the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Matlockf 3 In
that case, a young woman had consented to the search of an apparently shared room that the robbery defendant rented from
her parents.9 4 The district court applied a "two-prong test" requiring proof of both apparent and actual authority. The court
found that actual authority had not been established and held
that apparent authority alone was insufficient to validate the
search1 5 On appeal by the government, the Seventh Circuit af92. This limitation on third party consent, based on confidentiality
alone, has been extended to one other confidential relationship by the
California courts. People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d 487, 124 Cal. Rptr.
126 (1975), upheld a right of privacy in telephone company records of
calls made. But cf. People v. Elder, 63 Cal. App. 3d 71, 134 Cal. Rptr.
212 (1976); (identity of telephone and gas company subscribers not private).
93. 415 U.S. 164 (1974). Since Stoner, the Supreme Court had approved a reasonable mistake of fact corollary of Gorg in Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). Three cases based on Gorg had come up on
federal habeas corpus petitions without eliciting a clear rejection of the
apparent authority rule. People v. Cunningham, 188 Cal. App. 2d 606,
10 Cal. Rptr. 604, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 933 (1961), was attacked collaterally in Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965) (remand for
hearing), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968 (1966). The dissenter from the Ninth
Circuit panel thought that the trial judge "was entitled to rely" on a
landlady's apparent authority, 352 F.2d at 7. The majority did not discuss apparent authority. People v. Nelson, 218 Cal. App. 2d 359, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 675 (1963), survived collateral review in Nelson v. California, 346
F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965) (consenter had evident actual authority). The third case, People v. Bustamonte, 270 Cal.
App. 2d 648, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1969), culminated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (third party consent to search of car), which
merely approved California's voluntariness test for consent searches and
rejected the Ninth Circuit's requirement of a Miranda type fourth
amendment warning. Apparent authority advocates may also have been
encouraged by language in United States v. Hughes, 441 F.2d 12, 15 n.3
(5th Cir. 1971) and United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431
F.2d 839, 844-47 (3rd Cir. 1970) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing A.L.I.
endorsement).
94. 415 U.S. at 165-66.
95. Id. at 167.

132 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11: 115

firmed.96 The Supreme Court did not reach the question of apparent authority97 but reversed on hearsay rulings, suggesting
that actual authority had been properly established.98
The
Court's treatment of the lower courts' "two-prong" test was
somewhat equivocal,"9 but no Justice took the opportunity to
champion the apparent authority rule.
A California appellate court noted Matlock but expressly
applied Gorg in People v. Reynolds,10 0 upholding a wife's consent to the search of her husband's padlocked darkroom and the
seizure of photographs and other effects.' 1 Noting similarities
to the facts of Matlock, the court held that the police had no duty
to consult the arrested '(and thus available) defendant about the
search, and rejected the contention that seizure of his effects was
beyond his wife's power to authorize.' 0 2 The court devoted considerable attention to actual authority issues, perhaps guided by
prior California Supreme Court cautiousness and the possible implication of Matlock that actual authority was a necessary ele10 3
ment of a proper consent.
Another recent appellate decision, People v. Howard,04 upheld police entry into the halls of a locked apartment building,
partly on the ground that the manager had once given the police
a key, 10 although entry was effected without key or specific con96. 476 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1973). The court noted that an apparent
authority test alone would allow the consent of an impostor, remarking
that "[s]tatement of the argument is largely its own refutation." Id. at
1086.
97. 415 U.S. at 177-78 n.14.
98. Id. at 178.
99. Since the prosecutor argued that apparent authority was the
proper standard and the defendant was willing to tolerate its use as an
additional element while insisting on actual authority as well, that
"prong" was not at issue. The Court's opinion cited Gorg without disapproval in a list of "common authority" cases. Id. at 170 n.6.
100. 55 Cal. App. 3d 357, 127 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1976).
101. The court reasoned that the darkroom might have been locked
to prevent damage to film, and that others would have occasional access.
Reynolds' wife in fact told police where the key was kept.
102. Cf. State v. Gordon, 23 Ore. App. 587, 543 P.2d 321 (1975) (suitcase in shared closet; paramour's consent valid). But cf. State v. Fitzgerald, 19 Ore. App. 860, 530 P.2d 553 (1974) (private room, daughter's
consent rejected), State v. Matias, 51 Haw. 62, 451 P.2d 257 (1969) (private room, cotenant's consent rejected).
103. Matlock's intimation that the burden of proof on the prosecution
on these issues need be only the preponderance of the evidence may
have influenced the Reynolds court as well. See note 191 infra. But see
People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d 99, 137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135 (1977)
(consent provable by preponderance; any contrary suggestion in Reynolds disapproved).
104. 63 Cal. App. 3d 249, 133 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1976), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3802 (June 14, 1977).
105. Id. at 254, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 691. See People v. Chong Wing Louie,
149 Cal. App. 2d 167, 307 P.2d 929 (1957) (use of outer key obtained
in earlier case).
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sent.'0 6 The court also held that the defendant's expectation of
privacy implicit in the building's controlled access meant nothing
where police wished to "talk" with him, even if their conduct
The obscure third party consent and
amounted to a trespass.'10
its uncertain governing standards were relegated to an alternate
10 8
ground as the court fashioned a rule not dependent on consent.
Although these recent California decisions seem to show
ambivalence concerning the strength of the apparent authority
standard, perhaps they more clearly reflect the sense of caution
used in the application of Gorg to borderline situations. There
has not yet been any clear repudiation of the basic Gorg doctrine, either by the California courts or the United States
Supreme Court.
Apparent Authority As An Essential Element
Assuming for a moment that the actual authority requirement, as found in virtually all other jurisdictions, represents a
distinct federal constitutional standard, the California approach
could be criticized as constitutionally infirm for not requiring
'
The defect would be failure to
proof rising to that standard. 109
require actual authority, not the use of the apparent authority
rule itself. While California might at some time be forced to
conform to the actual authority standard, its courts would presumably be free to require proof of apparent authority as well. 110
The rule announced in Gorg has persisted as the test for third
party consent to search in California. While the rule's flexibility
has been abused, the state supreme court has steadily recurred
to limitations derived from underlying standards of actual authority. The importance of a reasonable police belief as to the
authority of the consent, recognized in Gorg, was perhaps
epitomized in the case of People v. Murillo.111 There an appellate court rejected a girlfriend's consent to the search of the defendant's locked attache case. As a co-occupant, she had validly
invited the police into the apartment. She told them that the case
106. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 254, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 691.

Contra, United

States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976).

107. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 255, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 692. His purported consent to the police entry was implicitly viewed as a ratification overcom-

ing any defect in the building entry. It is perhaps surprising that a more
substantial body of ratification theories has not developed as an adjunct
to the agency aspects of third party consents.
108. See also People v. Eastmon, 61 Cal. App. 3d 646, 132 Cal. Rptr.

510 (1976)

(reasonable belief of consent by third party as condition of

probation; any taint held purged).
109. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (federal standards applicable, but some flexibility in local rules permissible).
110. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
111. 241 Cal. App. 2d 173, 50 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1966).
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was Murillo's but didn't mention that she had a key to it. 11 2 Actual authority was shown, but the appellate court reversed for
failure to satisfy the apparent authority requirement." 3 This
isolated example of judicial zealousness ' 1 4 exemplifies Gorg's
focus on the reasonableness of police conduct. As such, the Gorg
rule has led to an additional apparent authority requirement in
jurisdictions other than California, and its focus on general
reasonableness has provided an influence on courts still grappling
with the basic independent right to consent standard.
THIRD PARTY CONSENT IN ILLINOIS

Actual Authority Requirements
In 1958, Illinois adopted the actual authority standard,
recognizing consents by competent persons in joint control or
custody of premises and effects. '1 5 The scope of valid third
party consent searches was enhanced by Illinois' refusal to be
bound by the traditionally strict approach to the question of
voluntariness. Like California, Illinois embarked on a permissive
approach to the issue, showing a deference to police testimony
which reduced the role of voluntariness in the assessment of the
legality of such searches, '"' thus leaving the actual authority requirement as the primary limitation on warrantless consent
searches.
112. Id. at 177, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
113. Id.
114. More typical decisions resolving borderline cases in favor of apparent authority include People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 648;
83 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1970) (consent of evicting landlady); People v. Howard, 166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1958) (locked-out girl friend
climbed in window to admit police), and People v. Herman, 163 Cal.
App. 2d 821, 329 P.2d 989 (1958) (consent of professedly casual occupant
alone in room "probably reasonable"). The apparent authority rule has
recently been characterized as merely a "good faith mistake" adjunct to
the actual authority doctrine. People v. Smith, 67 Cal. App. 3d 638, 136
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977)' (invalidating owner's consent to placement of
beeper in rented airplane).
115. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
116. See People v. Goolsby, 45 Ill. App. 3d 441, 359 N.E.2d 871 (1977)
(valid consent by chronic schizophrenic); People v. Fleming, 36 Ill. App.
3d 612, 345 N.E.2d 10 (1976) (valid consent after police entered with guns
drawn); People v. Gorsuch, 19 Ill. App. 3d 60, 310 N.E.2d 695 (1974)
(valid consent by fourteen year old); People v. Harvey, 48 Ill. App. 2d
261, 199 N.E.2d 236 (1964) (reversing finding of involuntariness); People
v. Speice, 23 Ill. 2d 40, 177 N.E.2d 233 (1961) (wife denied consenting).
There have been two Illinois cases where involuntariness of a consent
to a search was established on appeal. In People v. Haskell, 41 Ill. 2d
25, 241 N.E.2d 430 (1968), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's finding of voluntariness where the police had testified that they
told the consenter to go get a gun and further explained that it was necessary to turn it over to them. In People v. Cassell, 101 Ill. App. 2d
279, 243 N.E.2d 363 (1968), an appellate court held that a consent procured after an illegal arrest was coerced.
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After routinely approving consents by various co-occupants
of dwellings ' 7 and properly rejecting a hotel manager's consent,"18 Illinois courts began to show signs of increased sensitivity to the limitations of the actual authority standard. In People
v. Rodriquez,' 9 an appellate court reached out to reject a parttime occupant's consent to the search of the defendant's rented
room, despite the fact that the consenter reasonably appeared
to be defendant's wife. Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court
expressly rejected a strong apparent authority argument in
People v. Miller,"20 holding that a reasonable mistake of fact as
to the ownership of a car vitiated a search authorized by the
12
apparent owner.
The strictness of actual authority requirements for searches
of the home was demonstrated in People v. Weinstein."2 - In that
case, the father of a murder victim, who was the administrator
of the estate, secured a probate order barring the accused wife
from her home and authorized police searches on the strength
of his key and right of entry. The trial judge rejected the
rights in the premfather's consent, finding he lacked coequal
23
ises, and the appellate court affirmed.
However, Illinois did not interpret the actual authority
standard as requiring coequal rights to consent to the search
of personal property. Mere custody of or access to personal effects, without any sharing of use, was held sufficient to authorize
117. People v. Walker, 34 Ill. 2d 23, 213 N.E.2d 552 (1966) (sister),
People V. Voleta, 57 Ill. App. 2d 279. 206 N.E.2d 737 (1965) (brother),

People v. Palmer, 26 Ill. 2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 236 (1962) (defendant's tenant; common area).

118. People v. Bankhead, 27 Ill. 2d 18, 187 N.E.2d 705 (1963).

119. 79 Ill. App. 2d 26, 223 N.E.2d 414 (1967). The court considered
the full trial record to reverse the result of the pretrial motion hearing,
which was concededly correct on the facts presented.
120. 40 Ill. 2d 154, 238 N.E.2d 407 (1968). The court held that apparent authority was an inadequate basis because the defendant's constitutional right was "at stake." Id. at 157, 238 N.E.2d at 408-09.
121. But cf. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971) (reasonable mistake
of fact in arresting wrong person does not vitiate incidental search); People v. Henderson, 33 Ill. 2d 225, 210 N.E.2d 483 (1965) (reasonable belief
of fact of consent).
122. 105 Ill. App. 2d 1, 245 N.E.2d 788 (1968). Weinstein's conviction
for murdering her husband had been previously overturned, 35 Ill. 2d
App. 2d 78, 213 N.E.2d 115 (1966).
467, 220 N.E.2d 432 (1966), rev'g 66 Ill.
123. But when a wife, convicted of the attempted murder of her husband, challenged his consent to a search by arguing that marriage should
not result in a loss of her fourth amendment rights, the Illinois Supreme
Court termed her contention "entirely spurious," and thus strongly reaffirmed the general independent right to consent of any joint occupant.
People v. Koshiol, 45 Ill. 2d 573, 262 N.E.2d 446 (1970), cert. denied, 401
But see Note, Third Party Consent to Search and
U.S. 978 (1971).
Seizure, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 797, 800-01, 813 (1966); Comment, The Use

of Evidence Obtained During a Search and Seizure Consented to by the
Defendant's Spouse, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 653, 658.
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police intrusion leading to seizure. 124 The rationale for allowing
seizure of goods on the basis of third party consent was never
clearly articulated in Illinois cases, but could be supported by
theories of plain view or general assumption of risk. 1 25 Nevertheless, the notion that a person could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own room, beyond the power of consent
by a joint occupant of the dwelling, finally found expression in
26
People v. Nunn.
In Nunn, -the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a mother's
formal consent to the search of the defendant's locked bedroom,
holding that the defendant's exclusive use of the room precluded
third party consent to search. 127 The Nunn court expressly overruled the entire body of Illinois precedent insofar as it was inconsistent with its principles, an action that indicated a dramatic
limitation on third party consent searches. 12 8 This recognition
of a residual expectation of privacy in a shared dwelling seemed
to establish a broad principle that could logically extend to protect a defendant's rights in exclusively used personal property as
well as unlocked but clearly private rooms.
Despite the implications of Nunn, however, fourth amendment protection would not be extended by Illinois courts to
places or possessions not guarded by a lock. As in earlier cases,
mere access by a joint occupant of a dwelling proved sufficient
to validate a third party consent search. The strongly personal
nature of bedroom drawers and effects such as letters would not
prove private enough to evoke the protection of the Nunn holding.'"' Moreover, the solicitude of Nunn boomeranged in People
v. Fleming,130 where a defendant was denied standing to contest
the consent search of a co-defendant's separate locked bedroom
in the house they shared, because the other's right of privacy
was exclusive.
124. See, e.g., People v. Marino, 5 Ill. App. 3d 778, 284 N.E.2d 54 (1972)
(possessions stored in former home).
125. The extent of the general plain view rule in Illinois may be discerned from People v. Ciochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363, 319 N.E.2d 332 (1974)
(window peeping with binoculars by police not necessarily unreasonable). See People v. Wright, 41 Ill.
2d 170, 242 N.E.2d 180 (1968) (window peeping from public property held justified by probable cause).
126. 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973), cert.'denied, 416 U.S. 904
(1974), aff'g 7 Ill. App. 3d 60, 288 N.E.2d 88 (1972). The Illinois Supreme
Court dissenters found the defendant's privacy rights irrelevant and the
search reasonable, 55 Ill. 2d at 355, 304 N.E.2d at 87-88. See In re Salyer,
44 Ill. App. 3d 854, 358 N.E.2d 1333 (1977) (delinquency proceeding)
(mother's consent to search of fifteen year old child's padlocked bedroom valid).
127. 55 Ill. 2d at 346, 304 N.E.2d at 83.
128. Id. at 349, 304 N.E.2d at 84.
129. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 36, 335 N.E.2d 144
(1975) (brother's consent); People v. Stacey, 58 Ill. 2d 83, 317 N.E.2d 24
(1974) (post conviction petition) (wife's consent to seizure of shirt).
130. 36 Ill. App. 3d 612, 345 N.E.2d 10 (1976).
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Illinois Responses to United States v. Matlock
Although the final decision in Matlock did not decide the
validity of either the actual authority standard involved or the
additional apparent authority requirement, 1 3 the United States
Supreme Court's incidental treatment of those issues had distinct
effects on third party consent law in Illinois. The Court stated
that its few prior cases at least supported the validity of a third
party consent based on "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."1 3 2 Subsequent Illinois decisions have consistently referred to this somewhat vague formulation of the actual authority standard. 133 This influence of Matlock has resulted in some
undermining of the Illinois rule requiring coequal rights in the
premises for a third party consent to search.
One recent appellate decision refused to find "other sufficient relationship" where the defendant's brother, a non-occupant,
authorized a search of the family dwelling, despite the consent4
er's close ties, access and storage of belongings at the house."3
1 5
3 another appel late panel upHowever, in People v. Baughman,"
held the consent search of a barn owned by the state but used
by the tenant, on the theory that the state could have used the
barn for storage. The state's agent was held to lack authority
to consent to the search of the informal tenant's dwelling. The
prevailing opinion distinguished the two searches by finding a
lesser expectation of privacy in the barn. 136 Since the state did
not have a clear coequal right to use and occupy the house or
the barn, the decision may indicate a new sense of flexibility,
description of the actual authority
fostered by the indefinite
1 37
standard in Matlock.
On the other hand, the fact that the additional apparent
authority element survived Supreme Court review has led one
Illinois appellate district to adopt the two-prong test of authority.
In People v. Miller,138 that court announced the new test in the
course of adhering to the traditional rule that incidental rights
of access do not give a lessor the right to authorize a police
search. The court held only that actual authority was lacking,
See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
415 U.S. at 171.
See, e.g., People v. Stacey, 58 111. 2d 83, 317 N.E.2d 24 (1974).
People v. Taylor, 31111. App. 3d 576, 333 N.E.2d 41 (1975).
47 Ill. App. 3d 209, 361 N.E.2d 1149 (1977).
Id. at 214, 361 N.E.2d at 1152.
Id. at 214-15, 361 N.E.2d at 1152-53 (Trapp, J., dissenting). Judge
Trapp felt that this case did not fall within Matlock's focus on mutual
use as the basis for a defendant's assumption of risk. 415 U.S. at 171
131,
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

n.7.
138. 19 Ill. App. 3d 161, 310 N.E.2d 808 (1974).
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perhaps implying that the police reasonably believed the consent
proper due to uncertainty about the lessor's rights. 13 However,
in People v. Taylor "10 that court relied on police uncertainty to
find a lack of apparent authority, buttressing its holding that
a non-occupant family member could not consent to a dwelling
search, and reaffirming its adoption of the two-prong test. The
fourth appellate district has not yet been confronted with a case
involving actual but not apparent authority. Such a case would
test the vigor of that district's two-prong standard of third party
consent.
These Illinois cases, despite recent indications of erosion of
actual authority requirements and divergence of approach, still
show that narrow limitations, respecting secondary but exclusive
rights of privacy, may prevail over third party consent based
on general joint occupancy or power of access. This approach
is similar to that developed by the California courts under the
apparent authority rule. While the inner protection of rooms
and effects within a dwelling is not as great as that accorded
the dwelling itself, yielding to a proper right of access as opposed
to a coequal right of occupancy, that residual protection reflects
the survival of some purely personal rights of privacy after general expansion of the scope of valid third party consent.
FEDERAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE ACTUAL

AUTHORITY STANDARD

After a general acceptance of the basic joint control standard, the development of federal third party consent law has not
been notably clear or consistent. For the purpose of discussion,
modern federal case law has been broken into three segments.
First to be considered is the varied federal response to theories
that serve to augment consents based only on limited authority.
These gap-filling theories range from express assumption of risk
and intentional plain view to conspiratorial and exculpatory
powers of consent. Next the Seventh Circuit's experience with
the application of broader theoretical approaches, embodied by
tests of general reasonableness and actual plus apparent authority, will be examined. Finally, the collision of reasonablenessbased theories with the more traditional warrant oriented scrutiny in a selected recent case will illustrate the unresolved
philosophical conflict that leaves the law of third party consent
in a state of continuing uncertainty.
Filling in the Gaps of Authority
The privacy limit of the inner sanctum and private effect,
139. 19 Ill. App. 3d at 170, 310 N.E.2d at 815.
140. 31 Ill. App. 3d 576, 333 N.E.2d 41 (1975).
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gradually acknowledged in California and recently introduced in
Illinois under differing rules, was first articulated by federal
courts. 14' More recent federal court decisions have given only
sporadic support to this secondary limitation on third party conpreferring to concoct an assortment of theories with
sent, I
which to circumvent the obstacles to valid search and seizure.
This general tendency aggravates the inconsistencies that stem
from the variety of distinguishable factual situations and complicates the task of orderly analysis of federal law in this area.
Perhaps the clearest synthesis of third party consent law
may be found in an understanding of the limitations that a general assumption of risk doctrine imposes on an individual's
fourth amendment expectations of security and privacy. For example, one assumes the risk that his own waiver of rights will
lead to adverse evidence.143 And crucial to modern third party
consent doctrine is the risk that a joint occupant of premises or
a sharer of personal property will exercise an independent right
of consent to a police search or seizure.144 These fundamental
risks represent inroads on an individual's otherwise reasonable
expectation of freedom from warrantless searches unjustified by
the demands of exigent circumstances.
Since assumption of risk serves as a broad conceptual basis
for the validity of third party consents, it may be a useful tool
for evaluating the federal courts' response to claims of consent
based on third party interests amounting to less than joint occupancy or use, the area in which the most turmoil persists.
Further risks imposed by the federal courts fall into two general
categories. The first to be considered involves seizure of personal
property based on the consent of a third party who has only
a limited right to possession and perhaps no right to the use of
the goods. The other area of erosion and dispute involves consent
to entry and search of premises by persons lacking coequal
rights to occupancy and use.
The Risk of Casual Interest Consent Seizures
Two early federal cases rejected seizures based on third party
consents by persons with joint rights in the premises. In United
States v. Blok,' 4 5 it was held that a government employee's su141. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
desk).

(private

142. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 300 F. Supp. 1285 (D.N.H. 1969)

(suitcases).
143. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Howard, 462 F.2d 992 (1st Cir. 1972). But
cf. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (doubting voluntariness where knowledge of damaging evidence).
144. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
145. 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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perior could not authorize a police search of a desk exclusively
used by the employee, despite the concession that the superior
could have properly looked through the desk for official papers.
Blok recognized that a mere right of access into another's private
domain did not necessarily create a right to authorize a police
search. 140 The court in United States v. Holzhey'1 7 ordered suppression of the contents of a locked cabinet stored in a jointly
used garage, rejecting the cotenant's consent because the cabinet
was exclusively controlled by the defendant. These cases suggest
a general rule that exclusively used personal property lies beyond the effective reach of a third party consent despite some
degree of access. Such a rule would be consistent with the line
of Supreme Court decisions rejecting the consents of various
lessors, whose access for limited purposes could not be expanded
1 48
to include the right to permit searches.
However, the proposition that a casual right of access for
a limited purpose does not confer authority to consent to a
search, as held in Blok, was repudiated by a divided Fourth Circuit panel in United States v. Eldridge.149 In Eldridge a third
party who had borrowed defendant's car for the day was found
to have authority to consent to a search of the car's trunk because he had the keys and might have had occasion to open the
trunk while using the car. The seizure itself was justified by
the subsequent plain view of the gun that the police were seeking.'5 0 Thus the defendant was held to assume the risk that the
borrower's incidental access would support a search fully exploiting that access.
The inadequacy of casual custody as authority for consent
to the search of a locked container, as recognized in Holzhey,
failed to protect a locked accordion case secreted in defendant's
parents' attic in United States v. Rees.' 5 ' Because the parents
claimed never to have seen the case before, the district court
held that they had the right to find what was inside by allowing
police to force it open. 15 2 The Fourth Circuit upheld the search
146. Accord, United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(wastebasket). Contra, Shaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997 (C.D. Cal.
1972) (policeman's locker); People v. Tidwell, 133 Ill. App. 2d 1, 266
N.E.2d 787 (1971) (jail guard's locker).
147. 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955).
148. See note 24 supra.
149. 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
150. The majority in Eldridge found it significant that the police did
not rummage through the trunk, although such action presumably would
have been within the scope of the borrower's implied access.
151. 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961) (federal kidnapping charge).
152. A tag on the case bore the name and address of an unknown person, who was contacted later. The contents included a gun, which was
admitted into evidence, and various drawings, which were excluded as
"mere evidence."
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in a related case, partly relying on the theory that the mysterious
accordion case was apparently abandoned and stressing general
reasonableness.' 53 The Rees cases leaned toward an apparent authority rationale without expressly adopting it, adding the risk
that seizure of exclusively personal property could be validated
by uncertainty as to ownership on the part of a third party in
1 54
custody.
After extending such broad validity to third party consents,
however, the Fourth Circuit appeared to take a more restrictive
approach in Reeves v. Warden.15 5 In Reeves, the court ordered
suppression of a note seized from the defendant's bedroom dresser
drawer after a consent search authorized by his mother. The
trial court had suppressed clothes seized from the dresser but
had not suppressed the note because of uncertainty as to whom
it belonged. 156 The Reeves panel seemed to reject the mother's
access-based consent, but the decision actually may have been
grounded on the mere evidence rule, 157 which at this time limited
seizures to contraband, instrumentalities and fruits of crime. In
any event, despite some broad language from the Supreme Court
158
many other contemporaneous federal
in Stoner v. California,
decisions were beginning to find third party consent doctrine
flexible enough to permit casual interest consents to the search
and seizure of unshared personal property.
In Maxwell v. Stephens,'59 Justice (then Judge) Blackmun,
writing for the majority of an Eighth Circuit panel, condoned
a consent to the seizure of the defendant's coat by his mother,
solely because she had proper access to it. 1B° The police had come
without a warrant for the express purpose of getting the coat
as evidence against the arrested defendant. The lack of any
demonstrated need to act quickly was brushed aside by the majority's apparent recognition of a third party right to consent
to the seizure of another's personal property in a shared area.""
153. Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965) (state murder conviction challenged).
154. Cf. Driskill v. United States, 281 F. 146 (9th Cir. 1922) (defendant
denied owning trunk, joint user of garage invited removal by police).
155. 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
156. This result was apparently due to acceptance of the co-occupant
mother's access as proper, which vitiated defendant's standing to sup-

press the note, unless it was shown to belong to him.
157. This explanation would be consistent with the court's apparently

erroneous citation of United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md.
1961). See note 152 supra.

158. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
159. 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965).
160. The dissenter had serious doubts as to the voluntariness of the
consent and also would have required a warrant for the intentional seizure. Id. at 338-39.
161. Id. at 337-38. While the result could also be explained as
an intentional plain view seizure, the court seemed to imply that a spon-
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The Ninth Circuit took this assumption of risk approach a step
further in Marshall v. United States.1' 2

Marshall had stored an

unlocked briefcase with his landlady and instructed her not to
give it to anyone. But the landlady had already been contacted
by the F.B.I., and she opened the briefcase and summoned agents.
Although she acted outside her limited authority, a divided panel
upheld the consent on an express theory of assumption of risk.
However, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc soon overruled Marshall in the course of rejecting a common carrier's consent to
the search of a sealed package."'
Despite occasional adherence to the rule that limited access
for incidental purposes did not support a third panty consent to
police search and seizure, a significant trend toward disregarding
the right of security in personal effects had begun in the federal
courts. The basic independent right to consent standard, originally premised on coequal rights of joint custody or control, was
becoming broadened and augmented by an indefinite assumption
of risk doctrine. That doctrine essentially permitted warrantless
and intentional plain view seizures where police presence was
based on a lawful third party consent, even if actual authority
to consent to the search and seizure of an item was clearly lacking. More recent federal cases have tended to preserve this result, enlarging the risk that exclusively personal effects may fall
4
into the scope of a casual interest consent.1
taneous delivery of the coat had occurred, despite a clear request (at
the very least) for it. Cf. Coolidge v. New. Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (delivery of clothing after mere questions).
162. 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966).
A dissenter argued that the consent was invalid because the bailee had
not initiated the contact with police, a distinction used to distinguish
Holzhey in Sartain v. United States, 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1962). See
Comment, Third Party Consent Searches: An Alternate Analysis, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 121 (1973) (discussing this distinction). See also Nugent
v. United States, 409 U.S. 1065 (White, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (upholding landlord's consent with respect
to a stored trunk).
163. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1' (9th Cir. 1966). Subsequent
federal cases have reached generally contrary results on various theories. E.g., United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975) (finding common law duty of carrier to inspect suspicious packages); United States v. Groner, 494 F.2d 501 (5th
Cir. 1974) (no standing); United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 371 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973) (carrier search for "identification purposes"); Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968) (private
seizure). The narrow situation of a carrier checking damaged cartons,
seeing pornography and calling the F.B.I. has led to a recent conflict of
circuits. United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976), invalidated such a consent, focusing on the official seizure as unauthorized,
not inadvertent and a prior restraint on first amendment rights. The
Ninth Circuit squarely refused to follow Kelly in United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc hearing). For an attempt at
reconciliation of these and other similar cases, see United States v. Haes,
551 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1977).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Buckles, 495 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1974)
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The Risk of Semi-Authorized Consent Entry
As the federal courts began a general relaxation of strictures
on consent-based seizures, some erosion of the principles governing third party consent to the entry and search of private
premises also appeared. One case went so far as to validate consent to the entry of a dwelling by an eight year old girl. 165 The
fact that the only clear line of Supreme Court precedent relating
to third party consent had consistently rejected searches based
on the authority of a landlord with only incidental rights of
access 16 6 did not prevent some federal courts from finding ways
to uphold such searches.
In United States v. Cudia,167 the Seventh Circuit upheld the
consent of a building lessor who asserted a right of reentry because the rent was a month overdue. That result can possibly
be distinguished from the mass of contrary controlling precedent
on the unarticulated ground that the consenter, a convicted codefendant, had a conspirator's right of entry strong enough to
authorize breaking the lock to the storage building. 68 The panel,
however, simply held that the lessor had equal rights in the
premises without clear delineation of the risks that a lessee of
1 69
a locked building could be held to assume.
This indefinite approach was supplemented by a novel theory
of the right to consent in United States v. Botsch.170 Botsch
had rented a small shack for an office and given the lessor a
(coats); United States v. Hayles, 492 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974) (car);
United States v. Ellis, 461 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1972) (clothing); United
States v. White, 444 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1971) (zipper bag); Clarke v.
Neil, 427 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1970) (coat at dry cleaner), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 941 (1971), criticized in Note, Was the Right of Privacy Taken
to the Cleaners?, 73 W. VA. L. REv. 364 (1971). See also note 194 infra.
But see United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1976) (consent

search of another's suitcase invalid, harmless error); United States v.
Bussey, 507 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1974)

(same).

The Second Circuit once

raised but avoided this "intriguing question": whether consent to a room

search "willy-nilly" validates a search of all its contents, United States
v. Pravato, 505 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1974).
165. Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964). The little

girl also gave valid permission for an officer to use the bathroom, where

more evidence was discovered.

In a curious shift of proof burden, the

court stated that the defendant had failed to show that the eight year
old did not customarily greet and accommodate visitors.

166. See note 24 supra.
167. 346 F.2d 227 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965).

168. See United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom. Haynes v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 3649 (Mar. 31,

1977) (unindicted conspirator's consent, no key); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945) (Learned Hand, J.) (dicta suggesting
wife's consent valid as that of conspirator). But see United States v.
Poindexter, 325 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (rejecting cohort's consent
where no key was involved).
169. Cf. Weaver v. Lane, 382 F.2d 251 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 392

U.S. 930 (1968) (owner's consent "ousts" right of informal tenant).
170. 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967).
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key so that delivered packages could be put inside. The lessor
was informed by police of a mail fraud scheme and consented
to a search of the shack, providing the key. A divided Second
Circuit panel validated the consent due to the incidental right
of access and the lessor's "exculpatory interest" in permitting
the search. 171 Judge Smith bemoaned this rationale, perceiving
172
a serious inroad made into fourth amendment protection.
Botsch furnished a ground for validating consent searches based
on insufficient actual authority, an independent "exculpatory"
power that extended to redeem unauthorized cooperation with
uninvited police. 73 Failure to secure an available warrant, a
factor militating against the validity of a questionable consent,
receded into unimportance in the consideration of the "overall"
reasonableness of the search.
Recent Theorizing in the Seventh Circuit
The ReasonablenessTest
In 1967, the Seventh Circuit suggested a broad reformulation
of third party consent theory that tended to harmonize the inconsistent federal approaches to the conceptual problems raised by
consent seizures of another's property. Rather than focusing on
the nature of the agency connecting the consenter, defendant and
seized property, the court in United States v. Airdo174 found the
most relevance in "the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of a search consented to by a person having immediate con1 75
trol and authority over the premises or property searched."
Since a conceptually fatal lack of coequal authority was thereby
relegated to the lesser status of a factor affecting overall reasonableness, such a test allowed greater flexibility in approving
171. The landlord's cooperation would support his role as an unwitting
accomplice. This exculpatory interest, unavailing as it might be, is based
on two subjective factors: the actual or apparent suspicion of police and
the desire of third parties to cooperate in technical violation of another's
property rights.
172. 364 F.2d at 550-51 (Smith, J., dissenting). He saw the majority's
reasoning as applicable to any situation involving casual access and cooperative consent where refusal might broaden police suspicions. Despite the majority's disclaimers, Judge Smith saw no clear limit on the
application of Botsch to otherwise inadequate third party consents.
173. See United States v. Gargiso, 456 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1972) (cartons
in basement); United States v. Cataldo, 433 F.2d 38, 40 n.2 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971); United States v. Mazzella, 295 F. Supp.
1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (rented truck); United States v. Thoresen, 281 F.
Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (boxes in garage). But see United States
v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (exculpatory consent to office
search rejected); United States v. Poindexter, 325 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (third party rented apartment but had no key; exculpatory consent
argument rejected).
174. 380 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967).
175. Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added).
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third party consents, although it would also provide a basis for
reliance on vitiating factors that had not been directly implicated
by the independent right and agency standards of actual author'
ity.' 7
A divided panel found one such vitiating factor to be the
implied scope of consent given, where a wife's consent to a search
for narcotics led to examination and seizure of defendant's account books. 17 7 Judge Swygert called for a guarded approach
to third party consents because resulting searches were not governed by probable cause or exigency requirements. 78 Thus,
exemption from the fundamental terms of the fourth amendment
should lead to strict scrutiny of the reasonableness of such
searches.
When the Seventh Circuit routinely ruled that the wife of
an arrested defendant could consent to the search of their
dwelling in United States v. Stone,'7 9 Judge Swygert dissented
from the panel decision, making a comprehensive analysis of the
18 0
factors relevant to the reasonableness of a third party consent.
He saw a basic inconsistency in the view that a person assumed
the risk of a co-occupant's consent, but could invalidate such a
consent if present and objecting.18" Judge Swygert stated that
even under the risk approach, the reason for a defendant's absence became an important factor in determining reasonableness.
If arrested, the defendant would be reasonably available for
176. Hostility to the defendant, motivating an independent right

consent, has occasionally troubled courts.

See, e.g., McCravy v. Moore,

476 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1973) (reversing district court's rejection); State

v. McCarthy, 20 Ohio App. 2d 275, 253 N.E.2d 789 (1969) (estranged
wife); Kelly v. State, 184 Tenn. 143, 197 S.W.2d 545 (1946) (estranged
wife's consent rejected). But the attitude of the consenter is irrelevant

to the question of authority to consent, see United States v. Lawless, 465
F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Martin, 358 Mass. 282, 264

N.E.2d 366 (1970) (authority does not vary with warmth of relations).
177. United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971).
178. Id. at 129 n.1. Justice (then Judge) Stevens dissented on the
ground that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous.
179. 471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972).
180. Id. at 174-78.
181. See note 79 and accompanying text supra. This minor limitation
on consent searches was accepted by the Ninth Circuit in Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1968) (civil rights action), the only federal
holding on point. See also Carlton v. United States, 391 F.2d 684, 686
n.4 (8th Cir. 1968) (dictum). Cf. United States v. Poole, 307 F. Supp.
1185 (E.D. La. 1969) (invalidating search where consent not sought).
State courts have generally recognized the limitation. See Lawton v.
State, 320 So. 2d 463 (Fla. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Platou, 455
Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973); Dorsey v. State, 2 Md. App. 40, 232 A.2d
900 (1967) (objections valid). Contra, State v. Clemons, 552 P.2d 1208
(Ariz. App. 1976) (objection ineffective). Judge Swygert thought that
this right to countermand an independent right of consent revealed a
"fatal flaw" in the assumption of risk approach. If the right were truly
independent, it should prevail. But the general risk approach is probably flexible enough to accommodate the position that a person assumes
the risk of joint occupants consenting in his absence.
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solicitation of his own consent; while if the defendant were at
large, there would be a more convincing case for a third party
consent. However, situations involving a defendant present and
objecting to a third party consent search can be avoided by
police 182 and no court has found an arrested defendant's availability particularly relevant. On the other hand, no court has
answered Judge Swygert's reasoning.
The court in United States v. Robinson"'I approved a consent search of boxes in a shared closet. The defendant was still
at large, but Judge Swygert once again dissented, since the boxes
were not jointly used and the defendant had not disappeared
until after the first search.18 4 The majority's rationale vaguely
intermingled apparent authority and assumption of risk rationales, stating that the defendant "impliedly disavowed his expectation of privacy by disappearing.
...
185 The result in Robinson clearly shows that the reasonableness test can be used to
extend assumption of risk doctrine to validate third party consents of questionable authority. Nevertheless, the Robinson
decision also implied the relevance of apparent authority to the
reasonableness of a consent search.
The Two-Prong Test
In United States v. Matlock,8 6 the Seventh Circuit panel
approved the district court's requirement that both apparent and
actual authority be proved, over the prosecution's contention that
apparent authority was enough. 8 7 The court of appeals stated
that Judge Doyle's formulation of the two-prong test correctly
reflected the principles governing third party consent to search,
though previously the test "had never been clearly articulated."''8 8 While the general reasonableness test was not disavowed, apparent authority seemed to have emerged as the major
criterion of reasonableness beyond the basic actual authority
standard. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, but did not
reject the two-prong test. 1 9
Matlock brought the question of a co-occupant's consent to
the search of a dwelling before the Supreme Court for the first
time since Amos, over fifty years earlier. The Court noted that
the parties below had accepted the underlying principle em182. Query the result if loss of opportunity to object resulted from'

an illegal arrest.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

479 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 303-08.
Id. at 302.
476 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
476 F.2d at 1086.
Id. at 1087.

189. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.

1977]

Third Party Consent

bodied in the independent right to consent standard, which had
become the rule in state and lower federal courts, and gave a
short formulation of that standard.'"10 The Court did not directly
address the authority issue, but did indicate that the burden of
proof on the prosecution to establish the authority for a third
party consent was a minimal preponderance of the evidence.1 9 '
Thus one effect of Matlock was to validate a controverted consent
on the strength of police testimony that would suffice even if
not clear and convincing.'1"2 This new weakening of limitations
on third party consents, coupled with the refusal to reject the
claim that apparent authority alone was enough, suggests that
the sympathy of the Supreme Court rests with a more flexible
approach.
The Seventh Circuit has persisted in applying the two-prong
test to third party consents. But its appellate panels have
demonstrated a degree of flexibility with respect to each prong.
Where apparent authority was established by consents of a defendant's former cotenant and his landlady, but actual authority
seemed to be lacking, the panel decision seized on the defendant's
denial that he lived there to hold that the right of consent "reWhere actual authority was estabverted" to the landlady.'"'1
lished by a landlady's right of access to a henhouse used for storage, but apparent authority was questionable due to police
failure to ascertain her proprietary rights, another panel decision
relied on the fact that the henhouse was closer to the consenter's
house than the defendant's adjacent dwelling to uphold the
search.'" 4 This result seems justifiable only under Matlock's
190. 415 U.S. at 170 & n.7. A looser formulation appeared in United
States v. Gradowski, 502 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam), in which
the court stated that, "consent to a search by one with access to the area
searched, and either common authority over it, a substantial interest in
it or permisssion to exercise that access, express or implied, alone
validates the search." Id. at 564.
191. 415 U.S. at 177-78 & n.14. The Seventh Circuit had interpreted
"greater weight" to mean "a reasonable certainty," and stated that
such a standard was not subject to "abstract criticism." 476 F.2d at 1086.
192. Even before Matlock, some federal courts had apparently taken
this approach. See, e.g., White v. United States, 444 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.
1971) (consent by arrested girl friend, eight months pregnant, to search
of defendant's zipper bag). But cf. United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d
883 (10th Cir. 1977) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of fact of
consent).
193. Hayes v. Cady, 500 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974) (habeas corpus petition).
194. United States v. Cook, 530 F.2d 145 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
The court justified the intentional plain view seizure,
U.S. 909 (1976).
relying on United States v. Piet, 498 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1974) (warehouseman's consent to inspection of labels on stored boxes); Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974) (seizure of goods left by
trespasser); and United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1974)
(sister allowed police to use phone in defendant's bedroom; inadvertent
plain view). Cf. Commonwealth v. Latshaw, 363 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 1976)
(owner's consent to search of barn used by tenants). Noted as holding
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relaxation of proof burden, and casts some doubts on the significance of the Seventh Circuit's additional apparent authority
requirement. A subsequent decision has found apparent authority lacking in the consent of a person known by police to be
merely a casual occupant. That holding, however, was only
cumulative since the state likewise failed to establish actual
authority.' 9 ,
The Seventh Circuit's continued use of the two-prong test
indicates that the reasonableness of police conduct approach of
the apparent authority rule may be easily combined with the
independent right to consent theory of the actual authority rule.
Ideally, each element acts as a reasonable limit on the indefinite
assumption of risk doctrine that has given vitality to third party
consents. Requiring apparent authority tends to assure a responsible police assessment of a consenter's rights, perhaps avoiding
the risk of unjustifiably hasty action. Actual authority standards help to define the reasonable extent of apparent authority,
and the actual authority requirement guards against the risk of
third party consents breaching reasonable expectations of privacy and security. Although the two-prong test may represent
an optimal approach to the policies, interests, and constitutional
rights involved in a third party consent, the true measure of its
vitality must be found in its application. The application of the
two-prong test, like other approaches to the problem of third
party consent, reflects the tension between society's demand for
reliable evidence in criminal trials and the fundamental constitutional right enshrined in the fourth amendment.
United States v. Diggs: A Clash of Theories
The problem of a suspicious private bailee consenting to the
search of a locked box after calling the F.B.I. recently baffled
the Third Circuit in United States v. Diggs.196 The district court
to the contrary in Cook was United States v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284 (8th

Cir. 1974) (seizure of box in defendant's doorless office invalidated;
cotenant not joint user of office space). More clearly contrary is Niro

v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968) (divided warehouse).

The

Cook court's acceptance of an intentional plain view seizure based on
third party consent may be contrasted with the Seventh Circuit's application of the inadvertency rule to plain view during a search incident
to arrest, United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976). The
clearly intentional plain view seizure in United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164 (1974) (police stated that they were looking for the money
and guns), was not in issue and thus passed over without any comment
beyond Justice Douglas' insistent dissent that a warrant should have
been required under the circumstances.
195. United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1976).
196. 544 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc), vacating 18 Cr. L. Rptr.
2316 (Jan. 14, 1976) (3d Cir. 1975), aff'g 396 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1975).

1977]

Third Party Consent

had ordered the contents suppressed for lack of authority to consent, plain view being inapplicable. 197 However, on rehearing
en banc, the Third Circuit remanded for further findings as the
court split four ways. 198 A plurality opinion of four judges held
that either the warrantless seizure was reasonable and based on
probable cause, or the bailee's exculpatory interest gave him the
right to consent to the breaking of the lock.' 9 One judge concurred, finding the circumstances unique and unsuited to application of the exclusionary rule. 20 0 The decisive swing vote
dictated the result of requiring more findings to see if a proper
inventory search could be shown. 20 1 Judge Van Dusen, speaking
for the four dissenters, insisted that a warrant should have been
sought and exposed the precedential and conceptual weakness
of "exculpatory interest" consents. 20 2 He criticized the use of
a general reasonableness standard without reference to the warrant requirement, stating that "[u]nder such an unconfined
analysis, fourth amendment protection in this area would ap20
proach the evaporation point.,1 '
Diggs clearly illustrates a basic conflict in principles that has
long muddled the law of third party consent to search and
seizure. Essentially the lingering question has been whether the
reasonableness clause or the warrant clause should dominate
fourth amendment inquiry. 204 Diggs narrowly inclined toward
reasonableness. The plurality relied directly on reasonableness,
supporting their position with recognition of an exculpatory right
to consent. The exculpatory interest theory itself represents a
form of pseudo-authority that serves to validate a consent lacking sufficient actual authority in the name of reasonableness. 20 5
197. 396 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
198. 544 F.2d at 123.
199. Id. at 119-22.
200. Id. at 123-24.
201. Id. at 124-27.
202. Id. at 132-33 & n.24. Botsch had relied on Marshall v. United
States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), overruled in Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), limited in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
Botsch had distinguished Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610 (1961), because the consenter had a key, unlike the situation presented in Diggs. The exculpatory interest at stake is only that of con-

senting promptly to a warrantless search, rather than consenting and
then waiting a few hours for a warrant to be obtained.
203. Quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
315 n.16 (1972) (wiretap case).
204. The fourth amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
205. See note 171 and accompanying text supra.
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The plurality's citation of Stone v. Powell 20 6 serves as a

forcible reminder that the current Supreme Court views the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule as primarily based on the
deterrence of police misconduct, thus seeming to endorse the
focus on reasonableness rather than technical warrant requirements.2 0

Another judge in Diggs found similar significance in

the Supreme Court's further relaxation of standards governing
warrantless automobile searches and therefore excused the unjustified failure to obtain a warrant, reasoning that a bailee in
bare possession could pass that limited interest to police.2 0

8

He

stated that the opening of the box was valid if it be found that
20 9
the intent was to inventory and not search the contents.
The dissent in Diggs found the lack of a warrant fatal to
the search. They noted a number of factors which weighed
against upholding the warrantless search and seizure of the
locked box. First, the strict actual authority required for valid
consent to the search was lacking. Second, a plain view augmentation would be neither inadvertent nor even applicable to the
contents of the box. Finally, the police action could not be justified by any exigencies. 2 10

To uphold the search would be to cast

doubt on any definite limitation on third party consents, and to
rely simply on a vague reasonableness standard to protect the
constitutionally mandated security of the home and personal
possessions. Since Diggs clearly poses the issue that splits the
foundation of third party consent law, it could ultimately be an
apt vehicle for Supreme Court resolution in this expanding area
211
of divergent standards and inconsistent results.

206. 428 U.S. 465 (1976)

amendment claims).

207. Id.

(terminating collateral review of fourth

208. Under an inventory theory, the agents could be said to have
opened the box in order to catalog the contents, protecting the owner
against possible pilferage and protecting themselves against a possible
claim of pilferage by the owner. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of car); People v. Clark, 32 Ill. App.
3d 898, 336 N.E.2d 892 (1975). However, these fanciful considerations
add nothing to the validity of the original seizure, which Judge Gibbons
justified by relying on a narrow version of the exculpatory interest
theory. 544 F.2d at 125.
209. The dissenters noted that there was nothing to suggest that the
agents intended anything but an investigative search. 544 F.2d at 133.
210. The parties had stipulated that there was no reason that a warrant could not have been obtained.
211. A case that may shed some light on this issue is United States
v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1976), aff'd, 45 U.S.L.W. 4797 (June
21, 1977) (search incident to arrest of a double locked footlocker in open
car trunk invalid). Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in the Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that general reasonableness standards should govern searches that did not intrude on the
home, office or private communications. See also 45 U.S.L.W. 3713 (May
3, 1977) (summary of argument).
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CONCLUSION

Early third party consent law focused on the actual authority required to waive another's constitutional right of privacy,
requiring an express authorization by the defendant and clear
voluntariness. The rise of the independent right to consent
standard extended validity to consents of persons in joint control
or custody of dwellings and personal effects, displacing the strict
waiver standard. Scrutiny of the voluntariness of a consent
gradually dwindled to relative insignificance. 21 2 But the newer
actual authority rule still fell short of validating many arguably
reasonable searches on what could be described as technical
grounds.
The now prevailing view that the primary function of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct was the basis for Justice Traynor's formulation of California's apparent authority doctrine. That doctrine represents a
straightforward acceptance of reasonableness rather than exigency as the basic consideration in evaluating third party consent
searches. But the apparent authority rule was not carte blanche
for the police, as the California courts demonstrated by repeated
recurrence to underlying standards of actual authority to determine objective reasonableness.
Thus, despite the minimal demands of the apparent authority
rule, California courts have given substance to some limitations
on third party consent searches. California recognized the
validity of an objection interposed between consent and search,
and other jurisdictions have generally agreed.2 1 :; However, since
no court has held that the police should request consent from
an available arrested defendant,2 '1 4 the principle stands as little
more than a somewhat anomalous nicety. California rejected a
common carrier's consent to the search and seizure of bailed
goods, and denied a bank's right to surrender customer records,
but both approaches remain contrary to subsequent federal decisions rendered under standards theoretically more demanding.
Perhaps the most important California limitation on third
party consents is that where the police know that closed containers do not belong to a person giving consent to search, apparent
212. One remaining rule of voluntariness is that a claim of consent
will not salvage a search executed with an invalid warrant, Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
213. See note 181 supra.
214. The availability of a person whose rights are circumvented by
a third party consent search, even if not wholly irrelevant to the exercise
of an independent right of consent, remains a factor submerged in the
totality of circumstances of a given case.
in 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 807, 814 (1970).

This situation was criticized
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authority becomes inapplicable. If there is no other compelling
justification for immediate action, any claim of third party consent will fail as insufficiently authorized. Illinois has belatedly
recognized a similar rule respecting exclusive rights of privacy,
but the federal courts have extensively undermined such a rule
with a mixture of plain view, assumption of risk, exculpatory
interest and general reasonableness theories.
The unsettled state of the federal law of third party consents,
dramatized in Diggs, is due in some measure to the general lack
of Supreme Court resolution and guidance on issues going to the
core of fourth amendment theory. Stoner v. Californiawas the
last in a series of rebuffs to landlord consents. Erosion of its principles has gone largely unchecked.2 1 Frazier v. Cupp lent credence to the assumption of risk approach without analyzing its
implications. 216 Coolidge v. New Hampshire embraced a broader
assumption of risk approach by holding that no seizure occurred
when a wife produced and surrendered her husband's personal
effects upon police inquiry. 217 Finally, United States v. Matlock
appeared to tolerate a two-prong test of apparent and actual authority, while minimizing the burden of satisfying those standards and refusing to resolve even the conflicts of approach that
were within the reach of the Court.
The Supreme Court has never clearly decided which standards should govern the law of third party consents to search and
seizure. While the great variety of possible factual situations
complicates the formulation of definite limitations, the sheer
volume of unsettled law in this area provides the basis for full
consideration of the alternatives and cries out for resolution as
well. A fundamental question as to the importance of a warrant,
where the actual authority of a third party consenter falls short
of defeating a defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy and
freedom from warrantless seizure, has been squarely posed by
the split decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Diggs.
An answer by the Supreme Court could mean a long step toward
harmonizing the disordered federal law of third party consent.
The California apparent authority doctrine, like the Illinois
actual authority approach, has coherently recognized a core of
privacy in private rooms and personal effects. California's conceptual focus on reasonableness may ultimately point to a contrary conclusion, as the general trend in federal cases and the
appellate result in Diggs suggest. Under a general reasonable215. See notes 168 &173 supra.
216. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
217. See note 37 supra. See also 79 HARv. L. REV. 1513 (1966)
menting on Coolidge in the state courts).

(com-
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ness approach, effective fourth amendment protection against
casual and unauthorized third party consents may well, to use
Judge Van Dusen's term, evaporate.
The triumph of a general reasonableness approach over a
stricter warrant oriented scrutiny, in conjunction with focus on
police misconduct rather than actual rights of privacy, would
imply that the minimum constitutional requirements are satisfied by a gimple standard of apparent authority less demanding
than that developed in California. Such a standard could incorporate both standing requirements and flexibility of seizure that
California has disdained, and magnify the risks to constitutional
privacy created by third party consent law even further than
most courts have been willing to attempt. The law presently
is centered on assumption of the risk of consent to search by a
person in joint control of premises or effects, but has been riddled
with inconsistencies and uncertainty. The third party consent exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement does not
seem true to the fundamental maxim that such exceptions are
to be specifically established, well-defined and jealously drawn.

Lee Carson

